Abstract
In Central and Eastern Europe, economic reform consistent with Bretton Woods and European Union (EU) demands has replicated not only the rules and institutions that prevail in Western societies but also their patterns of consensus and conflict. Although central bank policy has been largely depoliticized in the 2004 accession states through the institutionalization of central bank independence, agricultural interests were mobilized—in some instances against the EU—in the course of accession negotiations. This article argues that as they engage in the explicit transfer of economic policy to post-communist states, international institutions simultaneously transmit beliefs about who has legitimate claims on the state. The methods through which international institutions help construct new markets in transition states have consequences for the development of domestic cleavages and for the cultivation of political support for economic integration.
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