Abstract

In 2005, Huang and Chang proposed two multisignature schemes with distinguished signing authorities. The two schemes are based on a RSA cryptosystem and a discrete logarithm with composite modulus. One scheme is suitable for sequential architecture and the other for broadcasting. However, the current paper demonstrates an attack on Huang-Chang?s two multisignature schemes in which attacker can derive a user?s secret key and forge multisignatures schemes in arbitrary messages.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.