Abstract
SKINNY is a family of lightweight tweakable block ciphers designed to have the smallest hardware footprint. In this paper, we present zero-correlation linear approximations and the related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics for different versions of SKINNY .We utilize Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) to search all zero-correlation linear distinguishers for all variants of SKINNY, where the longest distinguisher found reaches 10 rounds. Using a 9-round characteristic, we present 14 and 18-round zero correlation attacks on SKINNY-64-64 and SKINNY- 64-128, respectively. Also, for SKINNY-n-n and SKINNY-n-2n, we construct 13 and 15-round related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics, respectively. Utilizing these characteristics, we propose 23-round related-tweakey impossible differential cryptanalysis by applying the key recovery attack for SKINNY-n-2n and 19-round attack for SKINNY-n-n. To the best of our knowledge, the presented zero-correlation characteristics in this paper are the first attempt to investigate the security of SKINNY against this attack and the results on the related-tweakey impossible differential attack are the best reported ones.
Highlights
Because of the growing use of small computing devices such as RFID tags, the new challenge in the past few years has been the application of conventional cryptographic standards to small devices
In zero-correlation linear cryptanalysis, we look for a linear approximation with zero correlation for all keys
We presented the related-tweakey impossible differential and zero-correlation linear characteristics on different variants of SKINNY block cipher
Summary
Because of the growing use of small computing devices such as RFID tags, the new challenge in the past few years has been the application of conventional cryptographic standards to small devices. Sun et al in [SHW+14a, SHW+14b] extended Mouha et al’s work from byte oriented ciphers to bit oriented ciphers They presented a method for constructing a model that finds the actual linear/differential trail with the specified number of active S-boxes. Sun et al [SGL+17] obtained 16 related-tweakey impossible differential characteristics for 12 rounds of SKINNY-64-128 using the constraint programming (CP) method and proposed an 18-round attack on SKINNY-64-128. The main purpose of this paper is to search related-tweakey impossible differential and zero-correlation linear characteristics on SKINNY. We searched all relatedtweakey impossible differential characteristics having only one active bit in the input mask and output mask or tweakeys using Mixed Integer Linear Programming (MILP) while the cell size s = 4. Based on the 15-round obtained distinguisher, we present key recovery attack and propose 23-round related-tweakey impossible differential attack on SKINYY-n-2n.
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