Abstract
In this paper we analyze an authentication protocol so-called Pasargad which proposed by Arjemand et al. [1]. The Pasargad protocol is a distance bounding protocol which has been designed for RFID-based electronic voting systems. The designers have claimed that this protocol is more secure than Preneel and Single protocol [2], against relay attacks. However, in this paper, we present some efficient attacks against it. Our attacks include conditional impersonation attack and recovery key attack. Moreover, we show that this protocol has some structural flaw which may prevent to execution the protocol.
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