Abstract
A non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol allows N parties who know each other’s public key to agree on a symmetric shared key without requiring any interaction. A classic example of such protocol for N = 2 is the Diffie-Hellman key exchange. Recently, some techniques were proposed to obtain a NIKE protocol for N parties, however, it is still considered an open problem since the security of these protocols must be confirmed. In a recent work, Kowada and Machado [1] proposed a protocol that solves the NIKE problem for N parties. However, this work found security problems in the proposed solution and implemented an efficient attack to their protocol demonstrating that their key-exchange scheme is insecure.
Highlights
Key exchange schemes are very important in cryptography
A non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol is designed to allow N parties to agree on a shared secret without requiring any interaction
N parties publish their public keys and agree on a shared key k that is secret from any eavesdropper who only sees the public keys
Summary
A non-interactive key exchange (NIKE) protocol is designed to allow N parties to agree on a shared secret without requiring any interaction. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman [2] revolutionized the field with a non-interactive key exchange protocol (NIKE) for 2 parties (N = 2). The development of NIKE protocols for an arbitrary number of parties N has been a research topic for several years in the cryptographic field and some of the greatest researches of the area have tried to solve this problem. In 2017, Boneh et al [7] used indistinguishability obfuscation to propose the first technique that seems to solve the NIKE problem for N parties.
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