Abstract

In a (k, n) visual cryptographic scheme (VCS), a secret image is encrypted into n shadow images in such way that any k or more shadows can be superimposed to visually decode the secret, and less than k shadows cannot obtain any information on the secret image. Most VCSs only share one secret image. A (k, n, s) multi-secret VCS (MVCS) is a (k, n)-VCS, which can share s secret images. Recently, Chen et al. introduced a novel (2, 2, 4)-MVCS. However, their scheme is insecure. The threshold property of Chen et al.’s (2, 2, 4)-MVCS is compromised. In this paper, we show how an attacker retrieves the secret information of Chen et al.’s (2, 2, 4)-MVCS from one shadow image.

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