Abstract

In a recent paper (AMIS, 6(2S), 2012), Lee proposed a dynamic ID-based user authentication scheme based on smart card which is believed to have many abilities to resist a range of network attacks. I n this paper, we analyze the security of Lee's scheme and show that the scheme is in fact insecure against insider-assisted attack, even if the adversary doesn't know the secret information stored in the smart card. In addition, the adversary can perform off-line gue ssing attack and impersonation attack if the secret information stored in the smart card is compromised.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.