Abstract
Virtual biddings are financial positions which enables market participants to arbitrage by using the expected price difference between day-ahead price and real-time price. Due to the interaction between virtual bidding and other financial factors, some market participants may gain improper profits in other related markets by manipulating virtual bidding positions. Therefore, virtual bidding is not only an important market design, but also a risk that regulators need to face. Considering the relationship between virtual bidding and financial transmission rights, we establish a bi-level model of cross-product manipulation in two-settlement energy market. Karush Kuhn Tucker condition, dual condition and large-M method are used to transform the model into mixed integer linear programming model. Finally, the effectiveness of the model is verified by the simulation on a five-bus system.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
