Cross-border cartels and international cooperation

Abstract

Enforcement of cross-border cartels (‘CBCs’) can be influenced by the size and maturity of competition authorities. Developing countries face several obstacles in investigating CBC cases. This chapter discusses how coordination games can bring a new tool of analysis for competition authorities in developing countries which face numerous obstacles in the cooperation of their anti-cartel enforcement efforts. It also touches upon the broader discussion around international cooperation and its challenges during times of crisis. Game theory can be instrumental for the alignment of strategies and developing of common enforcement between younger and/or smaller competition agencies. The chapter exemplifies how game theory through coordination games provide an alternative to the problem of cooperation based on real case studies. These case studies highlight the potential for better cooperation through enhanced alignment efforts among authorities. The chapter also underlines how a clear shift is needed for younger agencies to move away from the classic view of cooperation to more dynamic game theory approaches, especially in times of crisis such as COVID-19.