Abstract
AbstractIn this paper, we examine when the owners negotiate union bargaining and delegate production to managers, showing that an increasing degree of cross ownership exacerbates the conflicting interests between the owners and consumers. If the bargaining power of the union is weak, the owners will choose to bargain with the union and delegate to managers simultaneously. Otherwise, the owners will bargain with the union first and then set delegate incentives to managers.
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