Cross-cultural epistemic practices

Abstract

should provide a framework for the effective investigation of the entire complex problem of the intellectual processes of society—a study by which society as a whole seeks a perceptive relation to its total environment. It should lift the study of intellectual life from that of a scrutiny of the individual to an inquiry into the means by which a society, nation, or culture achieves understanding of the totality of stimuli which act upon it. The focus of this new discipline will be upon the production, flow, integration, and consumption of all forms of communicated thought throughout the entire social pattern. From such a discipline should emerge a new body of knowledge about, and a new synthesis of, the interaction between knowledge and social activity. (Shera, 1965, pp. 15‐16) In short, social epistemology for Shera was to be a discipline that examines the role of knowledge in society, as well as how knowledge is received and is distributed throughout society. Moreover, the discipline also has within its domain the examination of how culture and knowledge interact, how cultural attitudes ineuence and are ineuenced by the ‘communicated thoughts’ that circulate in society. The purpose of this paper is to investigate an aspect of this relation between culture and knowledge. My contention in this paper is that social epistemology as envisioned by Shera needs to pay closer attention to how culture and knowledge systems interact, and that the information professional needs to be aware of the cultural milieux of which she is a part. I propose that the epistemic practices performed by information professionals (and others) should be cross-cultural. The basic reason is that such a cross-cultural awareness will make it possible for information professionals to have a critical stance toward their own cultures. This stance could lead to the adaptation of some current practices of the culture, which may even realize the values of that culture better. In addition, awareness that other cultures might have other sets of epistemic values should lead to a recognition that one’s epistemic practice is only one among many. Such a recognition does not entail epistemic or cultural relativism; instead it means that reeection on one’s own epistemic practice is always an on-going affair and needs to be adjusted and re-adjusted due to changing circumstances. And the goal of the adjustment and re-adjustment should be tied to what the culture values most.