Cross‐Border Resolution of Failed Banks in the European Union after the Crisis: Business as Usual*

Abstract

AbstractThe post‐2007 financial crisis created an opportunity for reforms that could close the regulatory gap between transnational banks and national bank resolution regimes. During the decade before the crisis, the European Union tried to develop a cross‐border bank resolution regime relying on voluntary agreements and complex governance networks. However, these arrangements failed to commit national authorities to multilateral resolution as was exemplified by the case of Fortis. The crisis experience provided the Commission with an opportunity to propose legislation that would either deepen the pre‐crisis co‐ordinated regime, or replace it with an integrated resolution regime for systemically important cross‐border banks. The Commission considered the more ambitious reforms, but after the experience with negotiations over the powers of European Supervisory Authorities, postponed the proposals for an integrated regime until after 2014. The initial round of post‐crisis reforms thus remained limited to minimal improvements of the pre‐crisis status quo.