Abstract
To the consternation of economic theorists and agricultural policy makers, many farmers in the United States evince a hardy disinterest in crop insurance, even when that insurance appears to be “fair” or “more than fair” (that is, subsidized by the government). A variety of explanations have been advanced for this disinterest. One large category of explanations contains variations of the argument that farmers receive effective insurance through sources other than subsidized crop insurance. For example, a system of disaster payments during low yield years may obviate the need for crop insurance for many individual farmers. Likewise, farmers may avoid the consequences of low yields by avoiding the low yields through use of inputs such as pesticides and irrigation, thus making crop insurance unnecessary. (See Glauber, Harwood, and Miranda 1989, and Commission for the Improvement of the Federal Crop Insurance Program 1989 for an overview of crop insurance issues.)
Published Version
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
