Croissance et modes de propriété des terres

Abstract

Private property in land has often been criticized because it is supposed to bring about a waste of productive resources weakening economic growth. Indeed, because it is non reproductible, land earns a rent which increases in a growing economy and whose capitalization decreases the "productive" savings. However, public property in land does not imply the removal of rents neither insure a faster growth rate. If rents are given back to agents during the end of their life, this weakens the need of savings and diminishes growth. If rents are given back to agents at the beginning of their life-cycle, this can boost their savings. This paper contrasts the two preceding arguments within the framework of an overlapping generations model with endogenous growth. We find that, in effect, public property in land leads to faster growth. However, equilibria are Pareto-optimal under either property rights schemes. We conclude that the comparison of the two equilibria cannot be settled on the sole ground of Pareto-efficiency.