Abstract
This article aims to explore the relation between Deleuze and Peirce, from what seems to be the main point of confrontation between them: Deleuze's statement that there would be a zeroness before Peirce's firstness. Specifically, the aim is to criticize this statement in two ways: an exogenous one, based on the critique of Deleuze's understanding of Peirce's work; another endogenous, based on Deleuze's own concepts and comments. The hypothesis is that there is no a deep conceptual divergence. The key to understand this statement lies in how Deleuze’s limited knowledge on Peirce's theory led him to frame firstness into his own philosophical work and to disregard a Peircian concept that would be more adequate than zeroness.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a callDisclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.
