Critique of the use of neuroscience in forensic psychiatric assessments: The issue of criminal responsibility

Abstract

ObjectivesThis paper sets out to examine the way in which neuroscientific knowledge and techniques have been used in some European courts, in order to assess their impact on the assessment of criminal responsibility and to anticipate potential misuse of neuroscience in the courts. MethodWe conducted a case-law search and examined two European cases in which neuroscientific techniques were used in order to prove the diminished responsibility or irresponsibility of the accused. ResultsAfter reviewing these cases we concluded that there were significant difficulties and limitations of technical/scientific, conceptual and legal nature, concerning the use of neuroscience for the assessment of responsibility. DiscussionNeuroscientific data, no matter how accurate and reliable may become, will only make sense in the quest for the assessment of criminal responsibility if they are contextualized and supplemented with data collected from other levels of analysis. ConclusionDespite the importance of the contribution of neuroscience to forensic assessments for a more refined understanding of the complex interaction between the brain, mental states and behaviour, the use of neuroscientific evidence in legal contexts will not dispense with the need to define the limits of responsibility and irresponsibility of the accused. It is a social, moral, political and, ultimately, legal question.