Criticism of language and analysis of law. A pragmatics of normativity and social (de)ontology

Abstract

One important methodological challenge to normative disciplines like political or legal theory is if the method in question is purely descriptive or can be used to justify norms. Secondly, trying to incorporate ordinary language in the analysis of political concepts, this part utilizes arguments employed in the global justice debate. So, I will divide the paper into three parts: 1. Is the feasibility interpreted as a requirement of normative political theories? Firstly, I clarify the relation between experience and normativity; then I take a look at how the proto-normative and normative structures gained from experience become norms with a “critical” function. Finally, I will (re-)consider the normative feasibility criteria suggested by Hahn and by Räikkä. 2. After building a connection between the epistemic conception of criticism and the conception of politics within Kantian work, I first present Michelle Kosch’s Fichte, but then criticizing Fichte’s argument. Then, as Dworkin’s account of participation in coercion is challenged, I briefly elaborate on a roughly Dworkinian account of political equality. Lastly, I want to look into the relation between technical and ordinary definitions for political concepts, using elements taken by semantic and pragmatic old models, using populism as a case study. 3. In the concluding appendix, the connections between law and linguistic analysis of normative sentences will be examined, under the perspective of the Genoa Legal Realism.