Abstract
It furthers the dialectic when the opponent is clear about what motivates and underlies her critical stance, even if she does not adopt an opposite standpoint, but merely doubts the proponent’s opinion. Thus, there is some kind of burden of criticism. In some situations, there should an obligation for the opponent to offer explanatory counterconsiderations, if requested, whereas in others, there is no real dialectical obligation, but a mere responsibility for the opponent to cooperate by providing her motivations for being critical. In this paper, it will be shown how a set of dialogue rules may encourage an opponent, in this latter type of situation, to provide her counterconsiderations, and to do so at an appropriate level of specificity. Special attention will be paid to the desired level of specificity. For example, the critic may challenge a thesis by saying “Why? Says who?,” without conveying whether she could be convinced by an argument from expert opinion, or from position to know, or from popular opinion. What are fair dialogue rules for dealing with less than fully specific criticism?
Highlights
According to the dialogical approach to argumentation, arguments are inextricably bound up with critical dialogue, so that in order to grasp the nature of argumentation, as well as the norms with which to evaluate arguments, we should have a clear grasp of the nature of critical reactions, as well as the norms that govern criticisms
In response to a request for an explanation of a fully unspecific challenge, “Why A?”, the opponent is allowed to provide a counterconsideration that explains her challenge, which is more or less specific, but she has the right to make a remark to the effect that she has no further explanation to offer, "No further explanation," if at least she has not challenged a proposition that counts as a presumption
When having challenged a proposition that counts as a presumption, there should be an obligation on the opponent's part to provide an explanatory counterconsideration, if requested by the proponent
Summary
According to the dialogical approach to argumentation, arguments are inextricably bound up with critical dialogue, so that in order to grasp the nature of argumentation, as well as the norms with which to evaluate arguments, we should have a clear grasp of the nature of critical reactions, as well as the norms that govern criticisms. This paper assumes ( defended in van Laar and Krabbe, 2013) that an opponent (: critic, or antagonist of an opinion) has a responsibility, and sometimes even a dialogical obligation to provide the proponent (: arguer, or protagonist of an opinion) with a counterconsideration that explains her critical stance.
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