Critical Theory Between Modernity and Postmodernity

Abstract

Critical theory, as conceived by Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer, distinguishes itself from traditional theory by claiming to be a theory with In this regard, it finds its inspiration in Marx's famous Eleventh Thesis: philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways; the point, however, is to change it.' Contemporary critical theory, in the work of Jurgen Habermas, similarly draws its inspiration from the Marxian imperative to change the world, but interprets its task as the identification and clarification of the conditions for emancipated living. These conditions are grounded in a formal, procedural conception of rationality that leaves questions of substantive content to be determined by the participants themselves. While many have thought that Habermas has been mistaken to be so restrictive in the range of issues he allows for theory, his perspective is democratic in that it discourages theorists from making unwarranted claims to knowledge and aims to establish a basis for full and equal participation in community decision-making. He is certainly not indifferent to the others who have been excluded from the discourses of modernity, and his theory2 is an attempt to elucidate the ethical-political discourses in which the disinherited of the modem world can press to have their views discussed and their claims to rightness redeemed. Nonetheless, and despite these democratic aims, contemporary critical theory, in its Habermasian formulation, has seemed to many to be curiously disengaged from the world, and it is with some concern that the theory's proponents see the disinherited of modernity-variously defined as women, Blacks, gays, lesbians, native peoples, prisoners-finding their aspirations reflected in the increasing number of postmodern theories heavily influenced by genealogy and deconstruction. Recent critical theory, viewed from the standpoint of claims to have a practical intent and action orientation, is understandably the defensive. For is the point of wanting to effect fundamental social and political change, if those whose interest it is supposed to be to have such change do not see themselves addressed in the theory? In the last few years several adherents of critical theory have suggested that the opposition between modernity and postmodernity-an opposition fostered both sides of the modern/postmodern divide-is overdrawn, unproductive, and unnecessary, and there have been attempts by some to accommodate postmodern concerns by mediating between critical theory and the newer critiques. My essay begins by discussing two such efforts, those of Richard Bernstein and Thomas McCarthy.4 There are important differences between these two writers, but each seeks to regain some of the ground lost to postmodernism by arguing that the reconstructive project of critical theory is a necessary corrective to limitations in the newer methodologies and remains course to succeed, especially as regards its ability to deliver the idea of a practical intent. After discussing the argument provided by Bernstein and McCarthy, I offer an alternative assessment of is at issue between critical theory and postmodernism by turning to the question of gender. I conclude by resituating the problem of critical theory's supposed disengagement from the world. Bernstein tells us that his book, The New Constellation, arose out of suggestions that he take on Heidegger and the French. The more closely he examined the two poles of modernity and postmodernity, the more convinced he became that our modern/postmodern condition has to be understood as arising out of a constellation of social and political forces and as calling for a new understanding of how we should live in the world. The ethical-political question is the dominant motif in Bernstein's book and he formulates it as follows: critique in the name of what? or what are we affirming and why are we affirming it when we engage in critique? …