Critical Race Theory and Morality: New Looks at Original Sins

Abstract

I am trained both as a lawyer and an academic. I understand that is oxymoronic to some. But I did not learn about critical race theory (CRT) from my School of Law; I learned about CRT from my School of Education. Immediately, I became, and remain, excited to see philosophical theory applied to the lived experiences, ideas, and beliefs that I carried for years. It is that excitement that motivates and generates each of my research projects. Katrina Dillon’s essay excites and motivates me as well. And isn’t that what we most hope that an essay will do? Dillon’s essay expands on the underutilization of CRT in philosophy. However, at the outset, she complicates her endeavor. Initially, she states an intention to “analyze the morality(ies) at work within critical theory or CRT.” Then, Dillon informs the reader that “[a] critical race theory of morality” could inform a dialogue defining morality. Though subtle, the distinction between the tail wagging the dog or the dog wagging the tail is relevant. Morality could drive an analysis of CRT, its history, and its relevance to America’s future. I believe that Dillon is more concerned with how CRT can (re)conceptualize morality. So, this essay originates from that assumption. Moreover, because Dillon grounds her analysis in David Purpel and Derrick Bell, American philosophers, I will also focus my response essay on a European American conceptualization of morality.