Critical Perspectives on the New Situation of Global Ocean Governance

Regional and global ocean governance share complex, co-evolutionary histories in which both regimes – among others – interacted with and used the ocean and resources therein to consolidate, expand, and express power. Simultaneously, regional and global ocean governance relations have changed continuously, particularly when we are trying to understand their differences within the logic of regionalisation, regionalism, and globalisation. The paper is generally based on deductive reasoning and reflects scholarship in security studies, political science, international law, international relation, development studies, and African studies. It delves into the critical aspect of understanding the nexus/relationship between regional and global ocean governance in critical traditional and contemporary ocean policy domains, specifically from an African regional ocean governance standpoint. Ocean governance processes that are historically confronted by globalisation, multilateralism, and post-colonisation are confronted by the rise of regionalism, especially the need for nation-states and regions to respond to and manage traditional and emerging ocean challenges. Responses to these challenges by various actors, including states, economic blocks, private sector, financial institutions, and non-governmental organisations, development partners, etc., result in different forms of relationships that refocus regions’ activities toward globally defined ocean agendas. A review of different policy domains (including maritime security, environmental, economic, and socio-political governance) critical for regional ocean governance sets a robust background for understanding the contextual factors and concerns inherent in the regional-global ocean governance nexus. These outcomes, therefore, help us to arrive at a five-fold taxonomy of different types/degrees of linkages developed around the regional-global ocean governance relationship spectrum described as (1) discrete, (2) conflictual, (3) cooperative, (4) symmetric, and (5) ambiguous. Comparatively, experience and perspective from Africa are utilised to support raised arguments about these linkages. Furthermore, this spectrum allows for the diagnosis of the utilities and most prevalent arguments that regional governance’s effectiveness is directly related to the nature of the interaction between regional governance schemes and global governance; and vice-versa. This paper’s outcomes reveal how government, institutions, actors, and researchers address the relationship between regional and global ocean governance and generate a valuable way to think about current and future global and regional ocean governance direction while outlining some logical possibilities for an effective form of ocean governance.

Regional ocean governance: Polycentric arrangements and their role in global ocean governance

Theoretical exploration of the order transformation in global ocean governance and China's strategic response

This chapter focuses on the work of the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) and its possible relevance for global ocean governance. It first provides a background on WIPO and its activities, legal foundations and mandate before asking whether there is a place for intellectual property (IP) considerations in regard to global ocean governance. It then considers what role, if any, WIPO should play, as the competent UN agency responsible for the development of a balanced and effective international IP system, in strengthening the contribution of IP to the global governance of oceans, in line with Sustainable Development Goals 14 (Life below water). It also describes some key areas of overlap and possible interrelationships between global ocean governance and the work of WIPO from both normative and practical standpoints. Finally, it reflects on WIPO’s future role in the context of the evolving sustainable ocean governance.

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) remains the cornerstone of global ocean governance. However, it lacks effective provisions or mechanisms to ensure that all ocean space and related problems are dealt with holistically. With seemingly no opportunity for revision due to the Conventions burdensome amendment provisions, complementary mechanisms dealing with such aspects of global ocean governance including maritime transport, fisheries, and marine environmental sustainability, have been developed under the aegis of the United Nations and other relevant international organizations. This approach is inherently fragmented and unable to achieve sustainable global ocean governance. In light of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), particularly Goal 14, the IMLI Treatise proposes a new paradigm on the basis of integrated and cross-sectoral approach in order to realise a more effective and sustainable governance regime for the oceans. This volume focuses on the role of UN as the central intergovernmental organization responsible for global ocean governance. It examines the ocean governance challenges and how the present legal, policy, and institutional frameworks of the UN have addressed these challenges. It identifies the strengths and weaknesses of UN legal structures and offers tangible proposals to realize the ambition of a global ocean governance system.

The rise of non-state (international, private, and transnational) actors in global politics has far-reaching consequences for foreign policy theory and practice. In order to be able to explain foreign policy in the 21st century, foreign policy research needs to take into account the growing importance of nonstate actorss. A good way to do this would be to engage the literature on globalization and global governance. Both fields would benefit from such an exchange of ideas because their respective strengths could cancel out each other’s weaknesses. Foreign policy research, on the one hand, has a strong track record explaining foreign policy outcomes, using a broad range of theoretical concepts, but almost completely ignores non-state actors. This is highly problematic for at least two reasons: first, foreign policy is increasingly made in international organizations and intergovernmental and transnational governance networks instead of national institutions like foreign ministries. Second, the latter increasingly open up to, and involve, non-state actors in their policymaking procedures. Thus, if foreign policy research wants to avoid becoming marginalized in the future, it needs to take into account this change. However, systemic approaches like neorealism or constructivism have difficulties adapting to the new reality of foreign policy. They stress the importance of states at the expense of non-state actors, which are only of marginal interest to them, as is global governance. Moreover, they also conceptualize states as unitary actors, which forecloses the possibility of examining the involvement of non-state actors in states’ decision-making processes. Agency-based approaches such as foreign policy analysis (FPA) fare much better, at least in principle. FPA scholars stress the importance of disaggregating the state and looking at the individuals and group dynamics that influence their decision-making. However, while this commitment to opening up the state allows for a great deal more flexibility vis-à-vis different types of actors, FPA research has so far remained state-centric and only very recently turned to non-state actors. On the other hand, non-state actors’ involvement in policymaking is the strong suit of the literature on globalization and global governance, which has spent a lot of time and effort analyzing various forms of “hybrid” governance. At the same time, however, this literature has been rather descriptive, so far mainly systematizing different governance arrangements and the conditions under which non-state actors are included in governance arrangements. This literature could profit from foreign policy research’s rich theoretical knowledge in explaining policy outcomes in hybrid governance networks and international organizations (IOs). Foreign policy researchers should take non-state actors seriously. In this regard, three avenues in particular are relevant for future research: (1) comparative empirical research to establish the extent of non-state actors’ participation in foreign policymaking across different countries and governance arrangements; (2) explanatory studies that analyze the conditions under which non-state actors are involved in states’ foreign policymaking processes; and (3) the normative implications of increased hybrid foreign policymaking for democratic legitimacy.

As traditional risks in global ocean governance continue to deteriorate and new challenges emerge, the state-centered pattern of the international rule-making approach often demonstrates inefficiency and lack of fairness, hindering the achievement of SDG 14 and damaging the common interests of the international community. In this context, the International Union for Conservation of Nature has successfully participated in the development of international legal rules over the past few decades, providing valuable perspectives for improving international rule-making in ocean governance as a non-state actor. However, due to various internal and external factors, the potential of this pattern is still limited. Therefore, to compensate the inherent shortcomings of state-led mechanisms for developing international legal rules, non-state actors including non-governmental organizations and organizations of hybrid nature are encouraged to deeply participate in and even lead the international rule-making in ocean governance, while maintaining their neutrality and representativeness. This paper not only further clarifies the role of non-state actors in environmental and ocean governance, but can also contribute to the study of contemporary development models of the law of the sea.

As multilateralism evolves and China’s ocean awareness grows, China remains actively engaged in global ocean governance. The country has introduced the initiative of Building a Maritime Community with a Shared Future (MCSF), offering fresh perspectives for global ocean governance. The MCSF demonstrates both compatibility and adaptability with the evolving landscape of global ocean governance. This study is grounded in the historical context of the formation and evolution of China’s ocean consciousness within the broader framework of global ocean governance. Taking China’s contemporary ocean consciousness, the MCSF as the focal point, it analyzes the practical feasibility of integrating the MCSF with the evolving frameworks of global ocean governance. It is concluded that this integration process should involve ongoing review and refinement as the MCSF continues to develop.

This chapter focuses on the role of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in global ocean governance. Established under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the jurisdiction of the ITLOS comprises all disputes and all applications concerning interpretation or application of the Convention and all matters specifically provided for in any other agreement which confers jurisdiction on the Tribunal. In the performance of its responsibilities, ITLOS has accumulated a body of jurisprudence which constitutes its contribution to the progressive development of international law of the sea and thus global ocean governance. The chapter discusses the most important examples of the ITLOS's contribution to the global ocean governance, such as dealing with contentious cases, requests for provisional measures, and prompt release cases as well as providing advisory opinions.

This chapter offers an overview of the challenges and evolution of global ocean governance for marine environment protection over the past five decades. Scientific reports continue to present a bleak picture of the oceans despite the increasing international environmental instruments on global ocean governance. Many old challenges facing ocean governance such as pollution and unsustainable exploitation of marine living resources remain unaddressed. Furthermore, new threats to the ocean and seas have emerged in recent decades. Marine plastic litter pollution is one such new threat. The problem of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing is another new challenge facing ocean governance. Despite these new challenges, there are positive developments such as calls for expansion of marine protected areas, the negotiations on a new treaty for the conservation of biological diversity in areas beyond national jurisdiction, and the growing efforts to address the ocean-climate change problems including sea level rise. Absent urgent and innovative global governance measures, the health of the oceans and seas remain precarious.

This chapter analyzes the Taiwan's participation in ocean governance, within the constraints it faces in global diplomacy; and it takes note of the recent changes in cross-Strait relations. Comment is also offered on a way forward by which might be brought constructively into institutions from which it is now excluded or is restricted to only a limited policy making role. Taiwan's participation in global ocean governance has been denied over the past three decades mainly because of People's Republic of China (PRC) concerns over Taiwan's sovereignty and insistence on the One-China principle in dealing with so-called Taiwan issues, particularly those involving Taiwan's request to participate in UN-related organizations. The chapter concludes that Taiwan's efforts to participate in the UN General Assembly, ICAO, SPLOS, ICP, UNFCCC, CBD, and other ocean-related legal instruments and institutions should be welcomed. Keywords:cross-strait relations; global ocean governance; people's Republic of China (PRC); Taiwan; UN-related Organizations

This chapter discusses the role of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in global ocean governance. It first traces the history of the IMF, from its inception at Bretton Woods in 1944 to the late 1970s and beyond, and highlights the factors that have influenced its institutional development as well as its current institutional profile. It then describes the IMF’s membership, structure, main functions, and decision-making processes before analysing the possible input of the Fund to matters related to ocean governance. In particular, it considers the ways in which the IMF is involved in global ocean governance through its three main functions: economic surveillance, lending, and capacity building. Although the Fund has no direct relevance to global ocean governance, the chapter shows that the IMF may contribute to its improvement by providing technical assistance and policy advice, as well as a better interaction with other, more competent, international agencies.

As with other fields of international law addressing human‐nature relations, the Anthropocene invites the reappraisal and reimagining of the law of the sea, the primary normative framework through which states regulate access to, and the use of, the global ocean. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) effected a major shift in global ocean governance towards a public order of the seas. However, the law of the sea remains substantially tethered to a Holocene conception of the ocean as a stable environmental domain of extractive exploitation and jurisdictional demarcation. This is illustrated by the confined scope of negotiations on a new implementing agreement under UNCLOS on the conservation and use of marine biodiversity beyond national jurisdiction. Additionally, there has been limited acknowledgment of the multiple sites at which ocean governance in the Anthropocene takes place, in particular the central role of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change. It is contended that one way forward for addressing both these conceptual constraints and the UNCLOS and UNFCCC regime coordination challenges is the adoption of global ocean governance goals informed by the ‘Planetary Boundaries’ framework.

As artificial intelligence (AI) continues to transform the contemporary global order, its governance has emerged as a paramount challenge at the intersection of technological innovation and institutional frameworks, marked distinctively by the ascendance of Big Tech companies as formidable new actors in the international arena. This paper examines how Big Tech companies are reshaping global AI governance landscapes through their unprecedented technological capabilities and market influence. While existing literature acknowledges the growing authority of non-state actors in global governance, limited attention has been paid to the distinct mechanisms through which Big Tech companies influence AI governance dynamics. Drawing on new institutional theory and its three-pillar framework, this study develops an integrated analytical framework to investigate three key mechanisms: regulative, normative, and cognitive. Using theory-testing process tracing methodology and taking Google as a critical case study, this research systematically analyzes how Big Tech companies leverage their technological resource endowments, self-regulatory practices, and epistemic authority to influence global AI governance. The findings reveal that Big Tech companies significantly shape governance outcomes through: (1) embedding technical feasibility parameters in formal regulations and standards through strategic deployment of expertise; (2) establishing normative authority through self-regulatory innovations that diffuse globally via multilateral platforms; and (3) shaping shared frameworks of meaning that define how governance challenges are conceptualized and addressed. This study contributes to both global governance and public management literature by theorizing Big Tech’s distinct role as super-sized non-state actors and demonstrating how new institutional theory can illuminate governance dynamics beyond national boundaries.

Since the end of 2019 the new crown pneumonia epidemic has brought a profound impact on the world economy, the world economy has seen a large-scale contraction, economic and trade relations between major countries have faced great challenges, and economic forms such as trade protectionism and anti-globalization have been rapidly pursued, the new crown pneumonia epidemic has also led to the disruption of the global supply chain, and the industrial production of many countries has been seriously impacted, and the global political and economic landscape has undergone significant The global political and economic landscape has undergone significant changes, and global economic governance is facing numerous dilemmas, posing unprecedented challenges to the global economy. The shortcomings of the global economic governance mechanism dominated by developed countries have been highlighted, and the global governance mechanism dominated by developed countries is facing problems such as structural changes in the dominant forces, contradictions and conflicts between different forces, the evolution of the global governance system failing to keep pace with the development of globalization, the lack of opportunities for participation by disadvantaged groups and regions, and the diminishing dominant position of developed countries and other relevant countries in global governance. The Belt and Road Initiative advocated by China, based on its comprehensive national strength and the responsibility of a great power, advocates the building of a community of human destiny, adheres to the stance of multilateralism, upholds the concept of win-win cooperation and development, and focuses on the need to respond to global challenges and to promote changes in the global economic governance system. Based on a new type of development, multilateralism and economic globalization, China has participated in the transformation of the global economic governance system by strengthening global cooperation to prevent global economic risks, building a governance concept of a community of human destiny, formulating more balanced economic policies and rules, and realizing governance innovations in digital governance, so as to promote the improvement of the global economic governance environment conducive to the double cycle of mutual reinforcement. The Belt and Road Initiative advocated by China is a product of the changes in the world economy and the evolution of the international landscape, and its purpose is to conduct business on the basis of access to roads and navigation, to find a new impetus for the growth of the world economy, to respond to the deepening of economic globalization, and to realize the transcendence and reshaping of the pattern of global economic governance.