Critical Notice of Izenberg's "Psychohistory and Intellectual History"

Abstract

In this brief note I would like to consider some conceptual matters in Izenberg's recent analysis of the relationship between psychohistory and the history of ideas.' In particular, I wish to focus selectively upon what I regard as two distinct (but related) problematic issues underlying Izenberg's thesis: (a) his concepts of rationality and irrationality; and (b) his views on the origin versus the validity of ideas. The major ideas which emerge from a critical look at these two aspects of Izenberg's analysis are, respectively, that (a) rationality involves content that is, critique based upon human interests and values must be part of any conception of rationality; and that (b) the historical origins of ideas, both psychological and sociological, are dialectically connected to their validity. Briefly, it is Izenberg's thesis that psychoanalysis is a valid methodological approach for explaining ideas and beliefs held by individuals only when they are judged to have been arrived at irrationally. When an individual goes through a rational process of deliberation, then, according to Izenberg, a psychoanalytic account of his or her beliefs would be reductionistic and inappropriate. Thus, implicit in Izenberg's thesis, and in common with much of the literature in the philosophy of mind, is that one 'understands' rational beliefs or action, and it is only irrational beliefs or actions which need to be explained, or are susceptible to explanation.2 At first glance this argument has considerable force and appeal. Psychoanalysis is, after all, a psychological theory which was exclusively developed and tailored for explaining irrational thinking and behavior. While I am sympathetic with Izenberg's conclusion that psychoanalysis should be used only for explaining irrational beliefs, I disagree with how he arrives at that conclusion and his interpretation of it. On the surface, Izenberg's own approach is historical. He asserts that the norms of rationality are historical, and that one must not apply today's norms when evaluating whether an historical individual arrived at an idea or belief in a rational manner. At a deeper level, however, Izenberg's approach is ahistorical in some important respects. Thus he states that one must make a distinction between universal criteria of logic . . . which all cultures must have . . . and cultural rules and standards . . . which are indeed relative.3 For Izenberg, the concept of rationality involves an ahistorical Western logic applied to historically specific con-