Abstract
AbstractIn this chapter I will critically examine Hale’s proposals to characterize the notion of “a priori knowledge”. The chapter consists of three main sections followed by a conclusion. Only the first part of Sect. 8.1 is dedicated to Hale’s published work in contrast with the rest of the chapter. In section two I shall be dealing with the most recent developments where Hale (in seminars) proposes a new candidate, (H), for a definition of a priori knowledge. In section three I will closely examine whether it is coherent to talk of revision in connection with a priori knowledge – as Hale and other philosophers have thought – ending up with some remarks on the relationship between the notions of revision and a prioricity. In the concluding section I recapitulate the most important theses of this part of the book.KeywordsEmpirical indefeasibilityRevisionExperienceEvidencePreconditions for knowledge
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