Criteria for Theories of Practical Rationality: Reflections on Brandt's Theory

Abstract

There are various normative theories of practical rationality, i.e., theories about what it is rational for individuals to want and to do. According to Gewirth's theory,' for example, it is irrational for any agent, regardless of her psychological make-up and history, to deny any other agent freedom and well-being. According to Brandt's theory,' on the other hand, the psychological make-up and history of an individual determine what it is rational for that individual to want and to do. There have been various criticisms of individual theories of practical rationality, but there is no agreement about how to go about criticizing such a theory. For example, Daniels criticizes Brandt's theory on the grounds that it classifies as rational some desires that we intuitively consider to be irrational, and classifies as irrational some desires that we intuitively consider to be rational.' Brandt rejects all forms of intuitionism and so rejects Daniels' criterion. Parfit seems also to reject Daniels' criterion. He points out that our intuitions about what desires are rational have been formed by the self-interest theory of practical rationality. Thus, he claims, our intuitions about what desires are rational should not be allowed to prove the self-interest theory correct, nor should they be allowed to disprove rival theories of practical rationality.4 Since Brandt's theory is a rival to the self-interest theory, it seems to follow from Parfit's view that intuitions should not be allowed to refute Brandt's theory.