Abstract
People steal copper and other nonferrous metals to sell them to scrap yard. Simultaneously, prices at scrap yards are set by the world market. We argue that shocks in metal prices represent a quasi-experimental variation in gains from crime. This allows us to estimate the behavioral parameters of supply of offenses and test the economic theory of criminal behavior. Our estimates suggest that the long-term elasticity of supply of metal thefts with respect to the re-sale value of stolen metal is between unity and 1.5. Moreover, the system tends to equilibriate quickly — between 30 and 60 percent of a disequilibrium is corrected the following month and the monthly price elasticity estimates are around unity.
Sign-in/Register to access full text options 
Free) 
Talk to us
Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have
Schedule a call
