Criminal state: understanding narcotics trafficking networks in North Korea

Abstract

PurposeIn North Korea, illicit activities directly or implicitly supported by the North Korean Government are an integral part of the nation’s survival strategies. This study aims to discuss how North Korea directs its national power and resources to facilitate narcotics trafficking activities and how the role of North Korean State in the narcotics trafficking network has changed over time since the 1970s.Design/methodology/approachAnalysis of narcotics trafficking in North Korea has primarily involved a review of secondary data, including previous academic research in this field, news articles, circumstantial and forensic evidence, seizure data and defector testimony.FindingsThis paper argues that prior to 2000, North Korea was systematically and directly engaged in narcotics production and distribution. The nation state could be regarded as a form of “criminal sovereignty”, because the sovereign state is itself criminal. However, in the post-2000s, North Korea’s Government began to gradually withdraw from narcotics trafficking, creating space for various non-state actors – such as criminal syndicates, private traders and local officials – to enter the once-monopolistic network. De-centralisation of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea suggests that the state’s criminal sovereignty may be gradually eroding and the pattern of state criminalisation in North Korea may be transforming.Originality/valueThis paper draws on theories concerning state criminalisation to understand the changing dynamics of narcotics trafficking network in North Korea.