Abstract
We study criminal recidivism in Argentina by focusing on the rearrest rates of two groups: individuals released from prison and individuals released from electronic monitoring. Detainees are randomly assigned to judges, and ideological differences across judges translate into large differences in the allocation of electronic monitoring to an otherwise similar population. Using these peculiarities of the Argentine setting, we argue that there is a large, negative causal effect on criminal recidivism of treating individuals with electronic monitoring relative to prison.
Highlights
Every year a large number of individuals are sent to prison
In this paper we seek to contribute to an evaluation of electronic monitoring by providing evidence on one of the estimates needed for such an exercise: the difference between the recidivism rate of offenders treated with electronic monitoring and the recidivism rate of offenders released from a standard prison
As a benchmark it is helpful to note that, in the raw data, the prison recidivism rate ði.e., the proportion of individuals released from prison who have returned for another crimeÞ is 22.37 percent ð255/1,140Þ
Summary
Every year a large number of individuals are sent to prison. Given that prisons are expensive to build and run and often involve cruel treatment of fellow citizens, possibly contributing to the conversion of inmates intoWe thank the editor ðDerek NealÞ, a referee, David Abrams, Roland Benabou, Ilyana Kuziemko, Randi Hjalmarsson, Nestor Gandelman, Julio Rotemberg, Justin Wolfers, and participants at several workshops and the 2007 conference “Crime, Institutions and Policies” co-organized by the National Bureau of Economic Research and the Laboratorio de Investigaciones sobre Crimen, Instituciones y Polıticas at the Universidad Torcuato Di Tella for many helpful suggestions; and to Juan Marcos Wlasiuk, Cecilia de Mendoza, David Lenis, Hector Gatamora, and Ramiro Galvez for excellent research assistance. We thank the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research, the World Bank, and London Derby for financial. This content downloaded from 128.103.149.52 on Fri, 29 Mar 2013 12:29:31 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions criminal recidivism after prison “hardened” criminals, it is unsurprising that alternatives to imprisonment have been tried out. One of the more intriguing experiments in this area is the substitution of electronic monitoring for incarceration.. “Electronic tagging,” as it is sometimes called, involves fitting offenders with an electronic device ðon the ankle or wristÞ that can be monitored remotely by employees of a correctional facility who can verify whether the individual is violating a set of preestablished conditions. In this paper we seek to contribute to an evaluation of electronic monitoring by providing evidence on one of the estimates needed for such an exercise: the difference between the recidivism rate of offenders treated with electronic monitoring and the recidivism rate of offenders released from a standard prison
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