Abstract
How do international organisations (IOs) balance norms that have conflicting prescriptions? In this article, we build on the literature on norm contestation and norm conflict to identify four ways in which IOs might respond to norm conflicts: (1) consistent norm prioritisation; (2) ad hoc norm prioritisation; (3) balanced norm reconciliation and (4) imbalanced norm reconciliation. How IOs are more likely to respond, we argue, depends on the salience of the norm conflict and the relative strength of the conflicting norms. We illustrate our argument by investigating the norm conflicts that the United Nations (UN) encountered between traditional UN peacekeeping norms and the norm of international criminal accountability in the context of assistance by UN peace operations to the International Criminal Court. Distinguishing between behaviour and discourse as well as headquarters and field levels, we argue that the UN’s response strategies have been largely successful at reducing the tensions generated by the norm conflicts, but that in the longer term they run the risk of both undermining the international criminal accountability norm and damaging the acceptance and credibility of UN peace operations.
Highlights
The evolution of international norms has sparked renewed interest in recent International Relations (IR) research on the tension that might arise between two norms with conflicting behavioural implications
We studied how international organisations (IOs) respond to horizontal norm conflicts
We proposed a typology of responses, which acknowledges the peculiar position of IOs as norm promoters and norm implementers, while considering their status as complex actors with conflicting legitimacies and operating on different implementation levels
Summary
The evolution of international norms has sparked renewed interest in recent International Relations (IR) research on the tension that might arise between two norms with conflicting behavioural implications. When the UN is asked to assist the ICC, the international criminal accountability norm comes into conflict with the intersubjective expectation that the UN should not operate autonomously without the consent of its sovereign member states.
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