Crime After Conflict

Jack Provan

doi:10.2218/ccj.v2.5400

Abstract

Overwhelming statistical evidence shows a correlation between conflict and crime rates, both at a structural and individual level. This is assumed by many to mean that conflict is responsible for rises in crime. This article describes an alternative approach: that conflict is conducive to organised criminality, but does not necessarily cause it. By demonstrating examples from post-conflict societies, it is shown that the causal nexus of conflict and crime is actually security, development and governance. This effect is particularly pronounced where violent crime is concerned, but the inconsistent and often contextual nature of such crime renders any attempt to draw conclusions difficult. By framing peacebuilding efforts around conflict, and prioritising the neoliberal democratic model of the Global North as a cure to security and development shortcomings, crime is actually further enabled as the symptoms of criminality are not addressed. By returning the focus to security, development and governance, critical discussion may be able to cut through the noise and provide practical solutions to the crime epidemics characteristic of post-conflict environments.

Highlights

IntroductionStatistical evidence suggests a positive correlation between armed conflict and crime rates at a structural and individual level
By demonstrating examples from post-conflict societies, it is shown that the causal nexus of conflict and crime is security, development and governance
By returning the focus to security, development and governance, critical discussion may be able to cut through the noise and provide practical solutions to the crime epidemics characteristic of post-conflict environments

Summary

Introduction

Statistical evidence suggests a positive correlation between armed conflict and crime rates at a structural and individual level. Steenkamp theorises that this is because, in conflict, a culture of violence is normalised.[19] Camelo builds upon this groundwork to suggest that post-conflict environments are politically sensitive, and that violence represents the residual aggression of conflict.[20] This theory is supported by the continued violence by dissident rebel groups as a form of residual conflict in Colombia,[21] and is one of the reasons that the “post-conflict period” can be so hard to define It is widely claimed by advocates of the “violent veterans” model that ex-combatants are responsible for the rise in violent crime rates in post-conflict environments.[22] Certainly, this argument has some statistical credibility as rates of homicide in post-war transitioning states tend to be highest in areas of combatant resettlement.[23] Common trends seem to indicate that the economic prospects of returning ex-combatants and the quality of reintegration assistance are key indicators of the likelihood of recidivism. The following section demonstrates why this may not always be the case

Crime After Conflict

Conclusion