Abstract

This paper deals with credit rationing in bank loan markets. The bank is assumed to act as a Bayesian statistician to improve its subjective distribution of the default rate and its ability to identify risky loan applicants. Credit rationing arises as a result of profit maximization of the bank, which takes into account the expected amount of overall default as well as loans demanded by identified defaulters who are denied credit. The comparative statics depend, among other things, on the relative size of prior and sample means of the default rate, and on the form of the bank's information cost function.

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