Credit Crunch in the Euro Area: A Coopetitive Multi-agent Solution

Abstract

The aim of this paper is to propose a methodology to attenuate the plague of the credit crunch, which is very common in this period: despite the banking world having available a huge amount of money, there is no available money in the real economy. Consequently, we want to find a way to allow a global economic recovery by adopting a new mathematical model of “Coopetitive Game.” Specifically, we will focus on two economic operators: a real economic subject and a financial institute (a bank, for example) with a big economic availability. For this purpose, we examine an interaction between the above economic subjects: the Enterprise, our first player, and the Financial Institute, our second player. The solution that allows both players to win the maximum possible collective profit, and therefore the one desirable for both players, is represented by a coopetitive agreement between the two subjects. So the Enterprise artificially causes (also thanks to the money loaned by the Financial Institute that receives them by the ECB) an inconsistency between spot and futures markets, and the Financial Institute takes the opportunity to win the maximum possible collective gain of the coopetitive game (the two players even arrive to the maximum of the game). We propose hereunder two possible transferable utility solutions, in order to avoid that the envy of the Enterprise, which gains a much less advantage from the adoption of a coopetitive strategy, may compromise the success of the interaction.KeywordsCredit CrunchFinancial MarketsFinancing PolicyRiskFinancial CrisisGamesArbitragesCoopetition