Credit access for high-risk borrowers in financially concentrated markets: Do SBA loan guarantees help?

Abstract

The Small Business Administration's (SBA) loan guarantee program was established to correct financial capital market inefficiencies and improve small business access to financial capital. However, the SBA loan guarantee program has been criticized for its failure to improve the performance of financial capital markets available to small businesses. This study considers the financial capital market failure created by lenders' monopoly power (specifically, financial market concentration) in financial capital markets. Based on this potential market failure, a model is derived to evaluate the behavior of lenders and borrowers in financial capital markets. Using the national Survey of Small Business Finance, this study compares the financial characteristics of small business borrowers with and without SBA loan guarantees, and provides a qualitative assessment of the SBA's ability to correct financial capital market inefficiencies. When considering only the interaction between borrower quality and the degree of financial market concentration, high-risk borrowers in high concentration financial markets have a higher probability of receiving an SBA loan guarantee than low-risk borrowers in low concentration financial markets. However, when other factors influencing the demand for financial capital are included in the model, only the borrower attributes (credit risk and age) are significant. While the SBA loan guarantee program appears to partially mitigate the effects of the market failure caused by financial market concentration for high-risk borrowers, the program appears to be better designed to address borrower risk, rather than credit market failure.