Abstract
In an infinitely repeated game, sellers employ a trigger strategy of mutual forbearance from invasion of each other's markets, stabilized against invasion by the threat of Bertrand pricing. Contrary to conventional static models, this article shows stability for a wide range of transportation costs and present value parameters, and that increases in transportation costs tend to destabilize the collusive agreement.
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