Credibility‐based secure distributed load frequency control for power systems under false data injection attacks

Abstract

In the distributed load frequency control (DLFC) scheme, the compromised areas by attackers may endanger the stable and reliable operation of the entire power system. A credibility-based secure DLFC strategy is in this work proposed to sustain the stable operation of the power system under false data injection attacks. In this secure DLFC method, the gradientvariation- based credibility metrics are defined to detect potential attacked measurements. Then, the communication isolation decisions are made based on the adaptive thresholds. To compensate the impact of the communication isolation of misbehaving areas, predictions of future measurements by using the average gradient variation of stored healthy data are feeded back to the area controller. Simulation results of a four-area power system show the proposed secure DLFC can identify and cut off the communication of the misbehaving areas and still maintain the stability of the power system.