Abstract

Sri Lanka’s ethnic civil war between the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), also known as the Tamil Tigers, and the government of Sri Lanka comprising the majority of the Sinhalese Buddhist community came to a bloody end in May 2009. Muslims, whose political and civil society elite had largely supported the Sri Lankan state and security forces, welcomed the end of the war and the defeat of the Tamil Tigers given the history of the community with the LTTE. The expectations by the Muslims (and other communities) that peace would return to the country, were quickly dashed as it appeared that a new extremist Sinhala-Buddhist nationalist movement targeting religious minorities especially the Muslims would emerge as the country grappled with post-war reconciliation. The rise of anti-Muslim rhetoric, hate speech, and incitement to violence against the community has pushed some Muslims to think that they have become the new focus for Sinhala-Buddhist extremists in the wake of the defeat of the Tamil Tigers. With suspicions of the complicity of the state apparatus in the anti-Muslim campaign, there are serious concerns around the role and place of minorities (non-Sinhala and non-Buddhist) in the future makeup of the country. While there is no concrete evidence on the state’s support for such an action, it is clear that the reluctance of the state to bring to justice those responsible for hate speech and incitement to violence since 2009 raises some serious questions about impartiality. In addition, with the increase of detentions and scrutiny of the Muslim community’s post-Easter Sunday attacks and the recent treatment of the Muslim community in the response to the ongoing global COVID-19 pandemic, including shutting down of key Muslim towns and the enforcement of forced cremations (which goes against Islamic teachings of dignified burials), there is much to ponder of an anti-Muslim strategy being mainstreamed and institutionalized by the state. This paper will seek to situate the present response to the COVID-19 pandemic by the state and its particular actions affecting the Muslim community amid a wider backdrop of a rise in anti-Muslim hatred and action. In order to understand this, the paper will seek to understand the reasoning behind why Muslims who supported the war against the Tamil Tigers, have now become the enemy for Sinhala-Buddhist extremists. It does this through primary and secondary data gathering including interviews conducted between July 2020 and February 2021. In so doing this paper will explore the development of Muslim political and religious identity by looking at a historical perspective. This paper makes the argument that a holistic approach needs to be developed to avoid a new conflict taking place in Sri Lanka and to avoid violent Islamist extremism taking hold.

Highlights

  • Since independence in 1948, successive administrations in Sri Lanka have a history of accommodating Sri Lanka’s Muslim polity for a variety of reasons

  • In the light of growing Buddhist ethno-nationalism, especially after the end of the conflict in Sri Lanka in 2009 and in the wake of the Easter Sunday attacks, Muslims have been burdened with defending a religious identity and an ethnic representation that has become institutionalized since the time of the British rule in the country but open to scrutiny, especially in their relationship with the global community of Muslims

  • Though the government of Sri Lanka (GOSL) did not release the ethnic ratio of COVID-19 deaths, unofficial data suggest that as of December 2020, Muslims, constituted around 10% of Sri Lanka’s population and shared 40% of the total COVID-19 related deaths (Harees, 2021), the fact is that the death rate from COVID-19 in Sri Lanka is higher among people who identify as Muslims than Sinhala-Buddhists or Hindus or Christians or those with no stated religion

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Summary

Introduction

Since independence in 1948, successive administrations in Sri Lanka have a history of accommodating Sri Lanka’s Muslim polity for a variety of reasons. Politicians either lead politico-religious forces to woo votes or indirectly support such forces for political gains. Though it can be argued as to the veracity of the grievances from the majority, it is clear that these politico-religious forces represent a threat that cannot be dismissed . In this light, this paper will discuss problems confronted by the minority Sri Lankan Muslim community from grievances from the majority Sinhala-Buddhist community in the wake of the end of the conflict in 2009

Challenges in discussing Muslim identity
Conclusion
Findings
Author biographies
Full Text
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