Abstract
Based on a normative orientation and an interdisciplinary perspective, this is a comparative study, using the process tracing methodology, between the EU responses to Eurozone and Covid-19 crises to assess if, despite different outcomes, institutional decision-making processes evidence a change. The study concluded that the EU democratic deficit remains, which assumes special features in economic crises, providing a political oversize power to the economically hegemonic states, thus constraining ideological debate and making national interest prevail over politicisation. This perpetuates the conversion of structural economic positions into political power at the expense of political representative power and democracy.
Highlights
Eurozone debt and Covid‐19 economic crises can be con‐ sidered as ‘critical junctures’ (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422; Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–126; Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020, pp. 1042, 1051–1052; Schmidt, 2020, pp. 1179, 1182), understood as a sequence of abnormal and unexpected events, exogenous to the political system, requiring reactions and answers that may result in institutional change, impacting political institutions and policies (Capoccia, 2015; Stark, 2018)
The hypothetical power of a majority‐based Commis‐ sion gains ground when considering the EP adoption, in April 2020, of a resolution calling for a massive recovery package based on the reform of the EU’s own resources through enhanced fiscal capacity (European Parliament, 2020), or that the EP had already accepted in 2012 eurobonds could be a medium‐term solution for stabil‐ ising the Eurozone (European Parliament Resolution of 15 February 2012, 2012), exercising leadership on the issue, but restricted by the limits of constitutional design (Schoeller, 2019, pp. 150–157)
If responses to the Covid‐19 crisis suggest that a policy paradigm shift occurred, this does not translate to a change in this state of affairs
Summary
Eurozone debt and Covid‐19 economic crises can be con‐ sidered as ‘critical junctures’ (Braun, 2015, pp. 421–422; Heinrich & Kutter, 2013, pp. 124–126; Ladi & Tsarouhas, 2020, pp. 1042, 1051–1052; Schmidt, 2020, pp. 1179, 1182), understood as a sequence of abnormal and unexpected events, exogenous to the political system, requiring reactions and answers that may result in institutional change, impacting political institutions and policies (Capoccia, 2015; Stark, 2018). 1179, 1182), understood as a sequence of abnormal and unexpected events, exogenous to the political system, requiring reactions and answers that may result in institutional change, impacting political institutions and policies (Capoccia, 2015; Stark, 2018). They are opportune moments for assessing the demo‐ cratic legitimacy of the EU. Based on a comparative analysis of the EU responses to both crises, this research assesses the importance of the constitutional design to allow politically balanced outcomes and prevent economically biased decisions. The first part of the article presents the methodolog‐ ical approach that is used, the second provides a theo‐ retical review of the democratic deficit in the EU, while the third part presents a short description of responses to crises; the fourth section delivers the empirical analysis supporting the hypothesis and anticipating lines for discussion and conclusions
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