Covenantal Realism: The Self-Referential Incoherency of Conventional Social Contract Theory and the Necessity of Consent

Abstract

In this article I contend that conventional social contract theory is self-referentially incoherent. Conventional contractarianism therefore fails to provide an adequate foundation for the authority of the state and for the obligation of citizens to obey. The insistence on consent for legitimate political authority has usually been rendered in contractarian terms. Thus, the fall of conventional social contract theory seemingly entails that we should reject the principle of consent as well. Yet, the necessity of consent for the authority of the state and, concomitantly, for the obligation of citizens to obey seems to be an entailment of human equality. Thus, insofar as human persons are equal, the legitimacy of the state seems to require a foundation logically precluded to it. We are therefore confronted with a theoretical crisis. Even so, I will argue that we need not reject the principle of consent. The self-referential incoherency of conventional contractarianism results from its conventionalism. We can begin the work of salvaging the principle of consent from the demise of conventional social contract theory by erecting it upon the foundation of moral and ontological realism.