Cournot Oligopoly: Characterization and Applications.

Abstract

Preface Part 1. Introduction: 1. Introduction, purpose, and overview Andrew F. Daughety Part II. Background: 2. Of the competition of producers Augustin Cournot (translation by Nathanial T. Bacon) 3. Review of Walras's Theorie mathematique de la richesse sociale and Cournot's Reserches sur les principles mathematiques de la theorie des richesses Joseph Bertrand (translation by James W. Friedman) 4. Non-cooperative games John Nash Part III. Examining Cournot's Model: 5. On the existence of Cournot equilibrium William Novshek 6. Collusive behavior in non-cooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives Roy Radner 7. A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames James W. Friedman 8. Reconsidering Cournot: the Cournot equilibrium is consistent Andrew F. Daughety 9. An experimental test of the consistent-conjectures hypothesis Charles A. Holt 10. Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes David M. Kreps and Jose A. Scheinkman 11. On the efficiency of Bertrand and Cournot equilibria with product differentiation Xavier Vives 12. Price competition vs. quantity competition: the role of uncertainty Paul Klemperer and Margaret Meyer Part IV. Applications: 13. Cournot and Walras equilibrium William Novshek and Hugo Sonnenschein 14. Duopoly information equilibrium: Cournot and Bertrand Xavier Vives 15. Information transmission - Cournot and Bertrand equilibria Esther Gal-Or 16. Uncertainty resolution, private information aggregation, and the Cournot competitive limit Thomas R. Palfrey 17. Losses from horizontal merger: the effects of an exogenous change in industry structure on Cournot-Nash equilibrium Stephen W. Salant, Sheldon Switzer, and Robert J. Reynolds 18. Delegation and the theory of the firm John Vickers 19. A study of cartel stability: the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886 Robert H. Porter 20. Oligopoly and financial structure: the limited liability effect James A. Brander and Tracy R. Lewis.