Abstract
We modify the Cournot model by allowing for two production periods before the market clears. The firms choose outputs simultaneously in the first period. These outputs become common knowledge and then the firms choose how much more to produce in the second period before the market clears. Any outcome on the outer envelope of the best-response functions between and including the firms' smallest Stackelberg outcomes is sustainable as a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.
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