Courage and Wisdom in Plato's Laches

Abstract

P L A T O DEVOTES a surprising amount of a t tent ion to the virtue of courage in the early dialogues. A major portion of the Protagoras is given over to a discussion of the relationship between courage and knowledge (349d-60e). And of course courage is the theme of the Laches. Temperance and piety are the main topics of the Charmides and Euthyphro respectively, but they receive little more than passing at tent ion in other early dialogues. The virtue of justice is not discussed in any of the early dialogues, unless one includes among them Book I of the Republic. Why does Plato single out courage for such special treatment? One possible reason is that courage, more than any of the other moral virtues, seems to be the crucial test case for the Socratic thesis that virtue is knowledge. The more common view is that morally good conduct requires two things which are distinct: the recognition of what one ought to do, and the resoluteness or strength of will to act in accordance with one's resolves. It is claimed that one often fails, through weakness of will, to do what one knows to be morally right. Resoluteness and strength of will are qualities associated especially with the virtue of courage. If courage is thought of as a virtue displayed not only in conflicts on the field of battle, but also in all inner conflicts between reason and the passions, 1 then the co mmo n view can be paraphrased as follows: morally good conduc t requires the knowledge of what one ought to do as well as the courage to do it, and these two things are quite distinct. Weakness of will is simply lack of courage, unders tood in this broad sense. Because of its close connect ion with the problem of weakness of will, courage is the virtue to focus on if one wants to test the Socratic thesis that virtue is equivalent to knowledge. I believe that in the early dialogues Plato is not merely elaborating the Socratic theory of virtue but is probing and testing it. I think this is the reason why he devotes a seemingly disproport ionate amount of at tent ion to the virtue of courage. Indeed, I shall argue that one of the main points Plato wishes to make in the Laches is that courage cannot be defined simply in terms of knowledge. Therefore , if my interpretation of the Laches is sound, we must conclude that Plato is not merely testing the Socratic theory of virtue; he is rejecting one of its fundamental tenets in one of the early dialogues. 2 Before turning to the Laches, I wish to examine a short passage in the Meno dealing with the nature of virtue in general. This passage will, I believe, provide useful guidance for the investigation of the Laches.