Abstract

This discussion examines how security and counterintelligence vetting practices vary across domains and how this informs our understanding of counterintelligence disciplines. Organizations in each domain must ensure that persons admitted as insiders can be trusted with sensitive information and the organization’s security. We look at some examples of counterintelligence vetting, seeking commonalities in vetting needs and practices between armed groups, corporations, and states. We compare, in depth, the vetting practices of Lebanese Hezbollah, the reconstituted Syrian intelligence services, the drug-trafficking group known as Los Zetas, and High-Value Technology Companies (HVTCs). The evident regularities and commonalities in counterintelligence vetting suggest cross-domain and cross-cultural targets for exploitation.

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