Counterinsurgency as an institution: Evidence from Turkey

Abstract

ABSTRACT Are emergency zones effective counterinsurgency measures? In response to Kurdish rebellion, the Turkish state put 13 provinces under emergency rule (1987–2002). In this paper, we investigate the link between emergency rule and electoral support for a pro-insurgent party. First, using the first-differencing method, we show that the tenure of provinces under emergency rule contributes to the vote share of the pro-insurgent party. Second, we investigate which counterinsurgency policies worked as a mechanism to connect emergency rule to pro-insurgent vote. We find that detentions targeting activists shifted electoral preferences toward the pro-insurgent party, whereas population displacement and party identifications with emergency rule led to an opposite outcome. These results show that (1) the legal-institutional framework of counterinsurgency affects civilians’ political perceptions in fundamental ways, and (2) it can lead to failure when its repressive arm target activism. Overall, the paper presents an institutionalist account of civilian perceptions during wartime.