Countering Protection Rackets Using Legal and Social Approaches: An Agent-Based Test

Giulia Andrighetto,Luis G. Nardin,Áron Székely

doi:10.1155/2018/3568085

Abstract

Protection rackets cause economic and social damage across the world. States typically combat protection rackets using legal strategies that target the racketeers with legislation, strong sentencing, and increasing the presence and involvement of police officers. Nongovernmental organizations, conversely, focus on the rest of the population and counter protection rackets using a social approach. These organisations attempt to change the actions and social norms of community members with education, promotional campaigns, and discussions. We use an agent-based model, which draws on established theories of protection rackets and combines features of sociological and economic perspectives to modelling social interactions, to test the effects of legal and social approaches. We find that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best, although even this must be used carefully.

Highlights

Protection rackets are widespread and can be found in many countries in the world
We find that a legal approach is a necessary component of a policy approach, that social only approaches should not be used because they lead to large increases in violence, and that a combination of the two works best, even this must be used carefully
Other related agentbased model (ABM) look at instrumental factors [75], how a team-reasoning approach changes entrepreneurs’ willingness to resist [76], and whether presence of fakers, who pose as mafiosi but are unwilling to use violence towards nonpaying shopkeepers, changes the protection racket dynamic [77]

Summary

Introduction

Protection rackets are widespread and can be found in many countries in the world. they vary in multiple ways, mafias can be defined as groups that specialise in the production and sale of protection to people and businesses [1, 2]. A core difficulty around combatting them is that they comprise a complex system with multiple relevant actors including a state, a mafia (of which there may be multiple competing against each other), shopkeepers and business-people, consumers, nongovernmental organisations, and the rest of society, as well as nonlinear feedback loops between the actions of these actors Another problem is that it is extremely difficult to conduct experiments on different policies to test their causal effects. Key agents in our model, entrepreneurs, who represent business people, and consumers, who represent the broader population of citizens, consider both their incentives and social norms when deciding how to act. Other related ABMs look at instrumental factors [75], how a team-reasoning approach changes entrepreneurs’ willingness to resist [76], and whether presence of fakers, who pose as mafiosi but are unwilling to use violence towards nonpaying shopkeepers, changes the protection racket dynamic [77]

Materials and Methods

Results and Discussion

Conclusion