Countering Ideological Support for Terrorism in Europe: Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir – Allies or Enemies?

Abstract

Since the events of 11 September 2001, Western efforts to counter ideological support for terrorism have primarily focused on defeating Al Qaeda and its violent allies. Many strategists have argued that the “Global War on Terror” or the “Long War” really is a war against “Islamist terrorism” or “(violent) jihadism.” Almost all of the Sunni extremists that are members of groups falling under these rhetorical umbrellas are drawn from the conservative Wahhabi/ Salafi tradition of Islam, but not all Wahhabi/ Salafi individuals and organizations promote violence. Ergo, the argument goes, one can divide and conquer the enemy by strengthening those Wahhabi/Salafi groups that denounce violence, so that they would then confront their violent brethren. This thinking has led policy makers across Europe (and the United States) to conclude that groups like the Muslim Brotherhood and Hizb ut-Tahrir, which are Islamist in orientation but do not necessarily call for terrorist acts, could be “engaged” and turned into “allies” in this war. This paper argues against this approach, and suggests that strategies based on such a framework will certainly lead to defeat in the “war of ideas,” since they mistake the nature and ultimate goals of the enemy. The deciding factor in choosing allies in this war cannot be based on tactics—that is, on whether or not a group has chosen to pursue violent methods. Rather, it must be based on ideology, on whether a group is Islamist or not. That means, in essence, that a non-violent, British-born, seemingly successfully integrated Islamist cannot be considered an ally in this struggle. However, an ultra-conservative Muslim immigrant to Europe—one who does not even speak any Western languages, but rejects Islamist ideology—can be. It is not possible to counter a powerful ideology without offering a better one. There is simply no easy or quick remedy to a problem (radical Jihadism) that has emerged as a combined result of decades of concerted efforts on the part of the Islamists and failed policies on the part of the Europeans. A comprehensive and longterm strategy that addresses both these challenges is needed. Therefore, this essay will