Abstract
One major drawback of deception detection is its vulnerability to countermeasures, whereby participants wilfully modulate their physiological or neurophysiological response to critical guilt-determining stimuli. One reason for this vulnerability is that stimuli are usually presented slowly. This allows enough time to consciously apply countermeasures, once the role of stimuli is determined. However, by increasing presentation speed, stimuli can be placed on the fringe of awareness, rendering it hard to perceive those that have not been previously identified, hindering the possibility to employ countermeasures. We tested an identity deception detector by presenting first names in Rapid Serial Visual Presentation and instructing participants to lie about their own identity. We also instructed participants to apply a series of countermeasures. The method proved resilient, remaining effective at detecting deception under all countermeasures.
Highlights
Lie detection is one of the most emotive and hotly debated of all human technological endeavours [1,2,3,4], with a long, and some would say chequered [5,6], history
A variety of questioning modes exist, key to all these approaches is demonstration of a differential response to a guiltrelevant test when compared to a guilt-irrelevant test. (In the Guilty Knowledge Test, which is our main area of interest, the former of these is often called the Probe and, the latter, the Irrelevant.) all such methods are confounded or, at least, significantly complicated by the possibility to apply countermeasures [4,13,14,15]
3.1 Group-Level Analysis There are, two Event Related Potential (ERP) components that in all four of our experiments, enable us to distinguish Probe from Irrelevant: a fronto-central complex, which we interpret as a P3a, and a parietal complex, which we interpret as a P3b
Summary
Lie detection is one of the most emotive and hotly debated of all human technological endeavours [1,2,3,4], with a long, and some would say chequered [5,6], history. As demonstrated in later studies by the same group, refined countermeasure strategies allowed that specific deception detection implementation to be partially confounded [16]. Analysis of reaction times (together with careful selection of the number of Irrelevants) and ‘‘P9’’ responses has been argued to discriminate countermeasure users in most cases [14,17]. It would be desirable, to have a deception detection system that prevents P3 amplitudes from being modulated by countermeasures in the first place
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