Counterfactual Thinking, Causation, and Covariation in Mock Juror Assessments of Negligence: Twenty-Five Years Later.

Abstract

In the past three decades, researchers have examined counterfactual thinking and causation in decision making. However, little work has applied these findings to trial settings. The present research examined two conflicting theories regarding counterfactual thinking and causation to elaborate on earlier work examining counterfactual thinking in negligence law cases. The research also expanded the earlier work by examining covariation theory, additional psychological measures, and the rank order and reaction time associated with counterfactuals. Participants read a summary of a negligence case that manipulated covariation information to suggest that the defendant or plaintiff caused an accident. Participants then completed counterfactual, preventability, or causal statements about the case before responding to legal and psychological measures. Overall, the research found support for norm theory and covariation, but mixed evidence regarding the role of counterfactual thinking and causation. Counterfactual thinking more strongly affected the duty and breach components of a negligence case, while causal thinking more strongly affected causation and legal decisions. Legal implications were discussed.