Counter‐argument self‐efficacy predicts choice of belief‐defense strategies

Abstract

AbstractResearch has identified many strategies people use to defend against belief‐inconsistent information. However, little research has identified factors that predict which defense strategy people will use when more than one is available. Two experiments tested whether people choose to counter‐argue belief‐inconsistent information because they believe arguing will be successful, but resort to weaker defense strategies because they believe arguing will be unsuccessful. Exposure to strong versus weak belief‐inconsistent information caused a decrease in counter‐arguing and an increase in ignoring (Experiment 1) or claiming a belief to be a matter of opinion (untestable) rather than a matter of fact (testable; Experiment 2). Consistent with self‐efficacy theory, expectations of successful counter‐arguing was the mechanism responsible for both effects. When people feel less capable of successfully counter‐arguing because the information is too difficult to refute, they resort to epistemically weaker defense strategies in order to preserve their belief.