Could Predatory Pricing Rules Substitute for Antidumping Laws in the Proposed China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement?

Abstract

The proliferation of trade agreements heightens the interest in predatory pricing rules because of their possibility to replace antidumping laws. Successful practices have already been achieved in several regional trade agreements. The current paper focuses on the proposed China–Japan–Korea Free Trade Agreement (CJK FTA) and argues that substitution may be complicated by the presence of two different forms of predatory pricing: dominance-orientated predatory pricing and unfair predatory pricing. Reviewing the rules of the former fortifies the evidence that specific rules of competition law can substitute antidumping law. However, by exploring the rules of the latter, this conclusion is troubled. Unfair predatory pricing rules, as they exist in China, Japan, and Korea, are prone to protectionist abuse. Hence, efforts to harmonize predatory pricing rules so as to abolish antidumping laws would confront more difficulties in the proposed CJK FTA.