Abstract

The recently reformed, Mexican power sector incorporates a market for capacity, which is balanced administratively after each delivery year. Both supply and demand are determined ex post, based on generator availability and demand, respectively, during 100 critical hours. We analyze the potential incentive for generation companies to withhold supply from the capacity market by withholding generator availability during operations. We compare Mexico’s capacity market to other global markets considering this potential market power incentive and introduce possible adjustments to Mexico’s market structure.

Full Text
Paper version not known

Talk to us

Join us for a 30 min session where you can share your feedback and ask us any queries you have

Schedule a call

Disclaimer: All third-party content on this website/platform is and will remain the property of their respective owners and is provided on "as is" basis without any warranties, express or implied. Use of third-party content does not indicate any affiliation, sponsorship with or endorsement by them. Any references to third-party content is to identify the corresponding services and shall be considered fair use under The CopyrightLaw.