Could a Good God Permit So Much Suffering?

Abstract

Abstract James Sterba argues that the evils of the world are so horrendous that their occurrence conclusively shows the non-existence of the all-good, all-powerful God of traditional theism. Specifically, Sterba argues that his three necessary moral evil prevention requirements (MEPR I–III) that are exceptionless minimal components of the Pauline Principle never to do evil that good may come of, it as well as the basic normative principles that Swinburne employs in his own argument, are logically incompatible with the God of traditional theism’s permitting all the horrendous evil consequences that occur in our world. In response, Richard Swinburne argues that our major benefactors, our parents and the State, have rights to permit us to suffer if doing so is necessary to secure some good for ourselves or others. Hence, Swinburne claims, since God, if he exists, is so much greater a benefactor than are parents and the State, that he has a far greater right to allow us to suffer a lot if allowing such suffering is the only logically possible way for him to secure some very great goods for ourselves or others. Swinburne then argues that the goods made possible by allowing humans to cause or cope with great evils, such as that we can make great differences to ourselves and others, and thereby make ourselves very saintly people, are very great goods.